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Executive summary
Investors seeking publicly listed companies with tangible links to the Net Zero 2050 (Net Zero) transition often struggle to identify and value opportunities and risks associated with climate impact. As a result, historical investments in this theme have largely been expressed via:
- buying or selling companies labelled “good” or “bad” based on reported emissions; or
- thematically buying companies that provide climate-related solutions without adequate consideration of risks and valuation.
In our view, neither approach succeeds in achieving a balance of generating attractive risk-adjusted returns while also delivering real-world products and services required for the energy transition.
To address this, the Antipodes Climate Delta Strategy (the Strategy) was launched in 2023 with the goal of bridging these objectives through a pragmatic value approach that seeks to pay the right price for resilience, growth and impact.
These objectives are underpinned by Antipodes’ proprietary climate methodology, which aims to identify companies where the intrinsic value from abatement, efficiency, or emissions removal (“transition opportunity”) is undervalued by the market. These companies are then assembled within a portfolio risk framework to deliver attractive long-term, risk-adjusted return outcomes.
We take the view that coupling this pragmatic approach with active stewardship provides investors with a practical solution for investing in the Net Zero.
We are optimistic that more global investors will adopt this approach. In doing so, this should help transition-enabling companies achieve fairer market valuations, thereby unlocking access to capital – a vital step in supporting further investment in the transition.
This paper explains the rationale and methodology behind the Strategy.
Introduction
Climate change is a far-reaching global phenomenon, and its financial impact spans all economic factors of production across vital sectors such as energy, agriculture/land-use, and chemicals. The challenge posed by climate change is that the world economy needs to re-prioritise use of production factors in those industries in a way consistent with reaching Net Zero.
Antipodes offers a pragmatic value approach to investing. We acknowledge both structural and cyclical change and define value investing as paying the right price for growth and business resilience. We invest across the continuum of low to high growth at the right multiple. As such, we see climate change and the transition to Net Zero1 as important structural forces, requiring trillions of dollars of policy-led investment by 2050.
As global investors, our goal is to understand what risks and opportunities the transition brings to companies in our investment universe. It is a challenging task, requiring a first-principles approach focused on corporate profitability. Currently the biggest obstacle for global investors is a lack of data and disclosure standards, which help to explain the financial implications of climate change.
We find that the prevailing use of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol Scope emissions data fails to appropriately allocate responsibility and impact across global supply chains. It also results in significant valuation dispersion among companies perceived to be leaders or laggards on the scope emissions metrics. We find that these metrics have little to do with financial impact and business value. Hence, an opportunity exists to generate alpha in parts of the market most affected by this dispersion.
At Antipodes, we study climate change through the lens of probability-weighted expectations of future risk and opportunity for corporate cashflows. While subjective in nature, this approach enables a forward-looking, holistic view on the financial implications of climate change.
The current state of play
Listed equities are essential to the global financial system, representing >40% of global net worth and serving as the main arena for asset price discovery. Credit markets and other emerging alternative asset classes rely heavily on this price discovery function.
Unlike direct project investments, when investing in shares of listed companies it can be hard to attribute specific climate impacts, and unlike charitable donations, investing in shares implies a need to generate an acceptable level of risk-adjusted return.
Unfortunately, global listed equity investors have struggled to reconcile the inherent conflict that exists between the pragmatism and rationality required for making good investment and corporate governance decisions with the well-intentioned desire to urgently contribute to the delivery of Net Zero.
Until now, we have observed two dominant styles of investor behaviour in relation to climate-risk awareness:
(i) Labelling companies “good” or “bad” based on their reported scope 1, 2, 3 emissions and/or availability of credible plans to reduce these in the future followed by:
- Selling/not investing in the “bad” companies and/or buying the “good”
- Engaging with companies around disclosure and putting pressure on “bad” companies to reduce Scope 1, 2, 3 emissions
(ii) Thematically identifying and buying shares of companies that provide specific climate solutions (sometimes irrespective of price).
Despite good intentions, each of these styles have deep flaws rooted in the conflict of attempting to be an investor and a policy advocate at the same time.
The latter style (like any thematic momentum style) delivered great returns in 2020-2021 period when there was a flood of new capital chasing the climate theme. Like most bubbles, it ended in a familiar fashion over 2022-2023. Many of the companies leading the bubble have either failed to deliver tangible products or services that were intended to accelerate the transition or suffered from business model failures. In many instances, these business models relied on policy support, which were inconsistent (e.g. hydrogen, offshore wind in the US) or unfavourable to attracting capital (e.g. race-to-the-bottom auctions for renewable offtakes). The lesson learnt is that buying shares in companies with thematically aligned products or services neither guarantees sustainable risk-adjusted returns nor the delivery of products, services or investments which have real-world impact.
The former style relies heavily on Scope 1, 2, 3 framework and a false assumption that selling “bad” and buying “good” companies or forcing “bad” companies to dispose of emission-intensive assets will improve investment returns. Such behaviour can lead to outcomes that are counterproductive to both investor returns and the facilitation of the transition.
Simply excluding high emitters has minimal real-world impact and misses the transition investment opportunity. Pursuing an aggressive agenda to push companies to dispose of emitting assets can be in direct conflict with a fiduciary responsibility to preserve shareholder wealth. It can also have much wider real-world ramifications such as electric grid blackouts, lack of essential public service reliability, cost of living crises and severe regional unemployment.
The missing link when investing in the energy transition
In our view the missing piece in the investment landscape is a strategy that targets attractive risk-adjusted returns delivered from a portfolio of stocks, issued by companies delivering real-world products/services required for the transition.
The intrinsic value of these companies is tied to physical activities that take the world from the state of global warming emergency that we are in today, to where we need to be by 2050. By assigning value to such activities, we quantify and express impact in the same unit of measurement (i.e. intrinsic value) as used by the rest of our pragmatic value investment process. This allows our portfolio managers to not only target specific quantities of impact, but have full visibility on expected risk/reward from ownership of this impact.
As a return-seeking strategy our goal is to allocate our capital to stocks where this transition-enabling intrinsic value is undervalued by the market.
If more global investors adopt a similar approach, we expect there will be less mispricing of the shares of these important companies. Fairer market valuation unlocks access to capital markets and is a vital step for supporting further investment into the Net Zero transition. An attractive and sustainable valuation also creates a feedback loop for global policymakers on the effectiveness of policies in reducing the cost of capital required for the transition.
Background on climate change
In recent years, many governments have started shifting policy focus towards dealing with global warming and the resulting climate change, with most major economies stating an objective to become Net Zero2 GHG by 2050-2060.
As stated in the Paris Agreement of 2015, to avert the severe consequences of climate change we need to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius (preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius) compared to pre-industrial levels. 2024 was the warmest year on record with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) predicting annual mean global temperatures over the end of the decade to be 1.2-1.9 degrees Celsius higher than the 1850-1900 average.3 This underscores the urgency of accelerating investment in decarbonisation.
Figure 1. Evolution of global mean surface temperature
Source: (IPCC 2018, p. 57).
It is our view that addressing this challenge requires a multi-decade, policy-led investment cycle. The scope of this effort is broad; it requires overhauling the way we source and use energy, re-engineering vital industries like agriculture, steelmaking, construction materials and chemicals. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates4 that a transition to a lower-carbon economy requires around USD1 trillion of investment annually for the foreseeable future.
The transition brings a threat to asset values in these sectors, as well as an opportunity to create value in the alternative supply chains.
For example, we estimate that to eliminate emissions from the energy sector by 2050, developed economies such as the EU and US need an incremental spend in the range of 2-3% of gross domestic product (GDP) per year, whereas emerging economies like China require mid-single digit % of GDP in incremental spend.
Supply chains in transition
The challenge posed by global warming is that the world economy needs to re-prioritise the use of the production factors based on reaching the Net Zero GHG target by 2050. This compares to the current and historic cost-to-output optimisation imperative, which led to the extensive use of cheap fossil fuels and other GHG-emitting processes. As this re-prioritisation occurs, some groups of economic agents stand to lose income, and others stand to gain. However, without re-prioritisation, all agents will eventually lose.
While Antipodes examines ESG related risks and opportunities wholistically, the Climate Delta approach is additionally focused on the transition from the vantage point of corporates.
We assume that the investable universe has three broad types of financial exposure to climate change:
- Direct exposure to weather events – companies directly impacted by the consequences of global warming
- Supply chains in transition – companies involved in legacy GHG-intensive industries and those climate-neutral industries that will replace them
- Consumers – companies that consume the end product of ‘supply chains in transition’, e.g. energy consumers
While an investee company can be exposed to any combination of these, specific industries tend to have an overwhelming bias towards one.
As investors in capital markets, our ultimate objective is to understand how enterprise values5 of the companies involved in Supply Chains in Transition will change over time. The companies in these industries are the ones that are currently adversely impacting climate change, and it is those industries (and their supply chains) that need to be re-engineered. Therefore, a systematic approach classifying what constitutes positive impact and negative impact is required.
Figure 2. Supply chains in transition vs Energy and Biomass consumers
* The strategy focuses on ‘supply chains in transition’, i.e. industries/processes which require a physical change in order to put the global economy on a sustainable path to Net Zero. Industries consuming products/services of ‘supply chains in transition’, or weather-exposed industries may experience financial impact and mispricing as a result of climate change and transition. We incorporate this into our estimates of intrinsic value, but these are not considered a primary focus of the strategy.
Defining positive impact
Positive impact is defined as either a reduction in the rate of GHG emissions per unit of useful output (i.e. abatement or efficiency) or the removal of GHG already contained in the atmosphere (i.e. removal). The difference between abatement and efficiency is based on whether replacement of the underlying emitter’s supply chains takes place or not.
Abatement can involve a modification or replacement of the physical emission source or process or of its fuel or components.
Efficiency impact results when that same source or process is used in a way that results in more output per same unit of emissions.
Table 1: Positive impact activities
| Activity type | Definition | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Abatement | Replacing or modifying an existing GHG emitter supply chain with an alternative, compatible with Net Zero by 2050 | Solar/wind energy Battery electric vehicles Fossil-based carbon capture & storage |
| Efficiency | Delivering meaningful levels of efficiency against competing products and/or installed base | Insulation Material reuse Energy efficiency (e.g. HVAC, hard-to-measure industrial energy efficiency) |
| Removal | Capturing and neutralising GHG already contained in the atmosphere | Sustainable forestry Ambient air carbon capture & storage Biomethane pyrolysis |
Abatement: We require that abatement solutions and processes must be compatible with achieving Net Zero. We determine this by comparing lifecycle emissions per unit of output of the alternative supply chain to that which is being replaced or modified. To achieve Net Zero, the solution or process must be fit for an outcome where at least a 90% reduction in lifecycle GHG is achieved without requiring further modification, replacement, or disposal of any part of the solution.
Efficiency: We recognise efficiency impact:
- For newly deployed (and/or existing in case of material reuse) efficiency solutions or products, which deliver credible6 energy or GHG-emission savings to the following highly GHG-intensive sectors:
- Heavy industry manufacturing: Iron and steel, non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous metals, chemical and petrochemical
- Heating and cooling (surfaces/gasses/liquids) in residential and commercial dwellings/buildings
- Manufacturing of hybrid (mild, full or plug-in) road vehicles.
In all other sectors, newly deployed efficiency solutions or products delivered by a step-change in technology, which produce a meaningful7 and measurable reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions per unit of useful output.
Removal: The process must demonstrate that GHG removal is greater than the lifecycle emissions required to deliver the removal solution. The removal must be permanent in nature (e.g. permanent sequestration in a cavern, extracting carbon in solid state from gaseous molecules, etc.).
Negative impact activities
Figure 3. summarises the flow of GHG emissions. Energy and biomass (agriculture, forest/land, waste) make up about 95% of the emissions, the remaining ~5% is process emissions (mostly clinker off-gas and F-gasses).
We consider the above business activities related to existing GHG-emitting processes as having negative impacts on climate. The only group of GHG emissions not included in our coverage is industrial processes, which make up about 5-6% of global GHG and are particularly hard to reduce and hard to measure source.
Similarly, our definitions of positive impact activities set forth further in this chapter take into account any GHG emissions incurred to deliver the climate change mitigation solutions. Therefore, we do not separately recognise the negative impact of GHG-emissions related to delivering positive impact, as doing so would result in double counting.
Our proprietary methodology: Climate Sum of the Parts and Transition Divergency Score (TDS)
Due to the absence of established industry standards for measuring the intrinsic value of the climate transition on investee companies, it was essential for Antipodes to develop a custom, proprietary process.
We developed a system to evaluate our investments through this lens of intrinsic valuation8, breaking down companies into their logical business units.
We pursued a custom business segmentation approach that isolates each company’s activities into our definitions of positive and negative climate impact.
Activities which meet our definition of negative impact expose the company to Transition Risk (T.R.). We ring-fence future cashflows backed by these activities and value them as a separate segment.
Figure 3. Sankey chart of global GHG emissions by gas / sector / end use
World greenhouse gas emissions in 2019 (Sector | End use | Gas) – Total: 49.8 GtCO2e
Source: World Resources Institute. Climate Watch based on raw data from IEA (2021), GHG Emissions from Fuel Combustion, modified by WRI. WRI 2020.
Similarly, activities that meet our positive impact definition provide the company with Transition Opportunity (T.O.) and are segmented separately.
The remaining company activities that meet neither definition, are classified as “other”.
Once we have assessed what percentage of a company’s intrinsic value is backed by T.R. and T.O. segments we calculate a company’s Transition Divergency Score (TDS), by detracting the percentage of a company’s intrinsic value exposed to T.O. less T.R.
The TDS score can range from -100% to 100%. As the TDS name suggests, over time we expect the intrinsic value exposed to T.O. to increase and T.R. to decrease, with the two diverging due to the Net Zero transition.
Figure 4: Example of Antipodes Climate SoTP and TDS
Our approach differs significantly to the GHG Protocol Scope 1, 2, 3, approach which requires companies to report GHG emissions from their own/controlled assets (Scope 1), or from assets owned/controlled by all their suppliers and customers (Scope 2 and 3). While our research reviews the same source of physical emissions,9 we analyse these on a forward-looking basis. Importantly our goal is to determine which company future net cash inflows are economically linked to these emissions continuing in the future (i.e. the T.R. segment) or, conversely, linked to products or services enabling abatement, efficiency or removal impact (i.e. the T.O. segment). It is not to figure out where ownership or control of physical emissions takes place.
Transition risk: For certain future cashflows of a company to qualify for this segment, we need to establish that they are linked to a physical GHG-emitting source via a non-interchangeable economic link. In the context of our methodology, interchangeable economic links are those that could be replaced with a climate-neutral alternative without having a material negative impact10 on the cashflows in question. Conversely, non-interchangeable links are those which expose the company’s cashflows to a risk of decline under the transition.
Transition opportunity: Future net cash inflows will be classified under the T.O. segment if they result from providing products or services that support climate change mitigation through abatement, efficiency, or removal.
Methodology in action: RWE AG vs Ørsted A/S
RWE owns and operates a diverse mix of generation assets primarily in Europe and the US, spanning fuel technologies including lignite, natural gas, nuclear, hydro and solar and wind. The company has undergone one of the most ambitious and successful transformations observed in global utilities. From 2016 to 2024, RWE transitioned from a German vertically integrated gas and power utility to one of the leading global renewable and flexible power developers. After years of steady execution, RWE’s management team have delivered a nearly 6-fold growth in the percentage of the company’s intrinsic value derived from its T.O. segment. Today the T.O. segment makes up >84% of the company’s intrinsic value, representing >€55bn of value and growing at a pace of ~€6bn/year via the development and deployment of more renewable/flex/hydrogen assets.
Table 2. RWE’s transition statistics for 2016-2024
| Year of valuation | Transition opportunity | Transition risk | TDS |
|---|---|---|---|
| (%) | (%) | (%) | |
| 2016 | 14 | 44 | -30 |
| 2024 | 84 | 11 | +73 |
Source: Antipodes TDS estimates.
Despite this progress, an assessment of the RWE’s Scope 1 “carbon intensity” places the company as the 75th most “carbon intensive” company of 2,528 constituents in the MSCI ACWI.11 This scoring is largely an outcome of the emissions generated by the company’s German lignite fleet. RWE’s “carbon intensity” score is ~6x the index average and it is among a small number of global companies that screen as owning “lignite power generation”. Factors like these mean many institutional investors cannot own RWE.
Antipodes values the fleet at <1% of the company’s intrinsic value, and recognise the power supply concerns that restrict the company from an early exit from this fleet.
Excluding RWE and the other 74 companies with higher reported emissions (~1.1% of MSCI ACWI) removes about 49% of Scope 1 emissions within MSCI ACWI. For many institutional investors, omitting these companies helps keep portfolio emissions at or below the index.
Lignite fleet operators, such as RWE and Energetický a průmyslový holding, a.s.(EPH), have established an agreement with the German government that sets forth a timeline for closure by 2030. This timeline may be extended to 2033 should the grid fail to secure sufficient new flexible generation capacity to reliably meet demand. The German grid is already showing signs of flexible generation capacity shortages with the country (once a powerhouse and a major regional power exporter) relying heavily on imports during the critically important winter months. The country’s sole contingency measure in the event of unavailable imports is the “Netzreserve,” which consists primarily of hard coal power plants.
Accordingly, Germany is presently unprepared to safely decommission lignite and coal power stations, and undertaking such measures prematurely may increase the risk of grid instability and blackouts. Consideration of these factors is essential for a comprehensive understanding of how the transition to Net Zero unfolds in practical terms.
Unfortunately, many global investors find it easier to screen this element of the transition out of their portfolios and agendas. Some even try using proxy contests to force companies to divest emission-intensive assets at any cost. Companies such as RWE are a clear victim of such behaviour, which offers an opportunity to those willing to scrape the surface and look deeper into the financial risks and opportunities.
RWE’s vision is to maximise the value of existing legacy assets and redeploy the capital into transition projects with attractive return profiles.
Conventional power generation will remain necessary into the late 2030s and early 2040s. Therefore, there is residual value in the lignite asset, especially when power demand rises, as we have recently seen in the US.
Back in 2017-2018, RWE’s management team secured the long-term economic value of the lignite fleet through a strategic hedge of carbon prices, which covered output until the mid-2030s. We estimate that this move secured enough cash to fully fund more than one year of the company’s Growing Green plan.
In our view, the company’s modern and well-positioned fleet of natural gas combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) is also required for the purpose of balancing the increasingly unstable grid. Certain CCGT assets could also be used to combust GHG-neutrally derived hydrogen, opening avenues to abatement (green H2) or even GHG-removal (H2 cracked from biomethane) impact.
While certain companies have opted to pay third parties to assume ownership of their fossil fuel assets,12 we consider RWE’s strategy to be a model example of effective leadership in the energy transition. It takes courage, strategic vision and execution discipline to manage all stakeholders involved in a way that does not compromise shareholder long-term interests. Our analysis highlights very few examples of companies exhibiting these skills.
ØRSTED – what price are you paying for impact?
ØRSTED is a Danish developer and owner of renewable power generation assets, primarily offshore wind. The company serves as an example of an entity affected by the 2020-2021 thematic bubble. As a European pure-play renewable energy firm with substantial ESG and investor relations resources, along with an ambitious growth strategy, Ørsted became a preferred choice among thematic ESG investors.
In 2021, both Ørsted and RWE had renewable power development pipelines of comparable scale, each targeting ~95 TWh per year of planned renewable output by 2030. Consequently, their commitments to global decarbonisation were similar when evaluated in terms of projected CO2 reductions. Despite both companies being major offshore wind developers, RWE’s pipeline was more diversified in terms of technology mix. Figure 5. on the next page highlights the relative comparison our team undertook to understand the valuation differential between the two companies at the time.
Figure 5. 2021 – Comparison of Antipodes’ RWE valuation of future impact vs the market’s valuation of Ørsted’s future impact, expressed in $/ton.
Source: Antipodes 2021
In 2021, our assessment highlighted the market was assigning ~43bn USD of net present value to Ørsted’s pipeline of unbuilt renewable projects. Four years after our initial review, it is clear the majority of funds invested in the pipeline did not surpass its cost of capital, resulting in zero or less in terms of net present value. Additionally, some US-based projects became multi-billion-dollar liabilities.
Ørsted’s limited focus on capital allocation and risk management meant that shareholders effectively subsidised the early development of the US offshore wind industry — only to see shifting political and cost dynamics undermine the effort.13
As a contrast, in 2021 we valued RWE’s development pipeline at USD8.5bn net present value, while the market attributed zero value to it. Rolling forward 4 years, the market is still valuing RWE’s development pipeline at zero. This is despite the company having a track record of delivering significantly better execution and capital allocation over this time and presently carrying ~€15bn worth of construction works in progress on the balance sheet, with clear line of sight to completion of all committed projects and continued increase in shareholder remuneration as the assets in the pipeline roll into operating status.
Figure 6. demonstrates that at €34.24 per share (29/08/2025), the market is essentially attributing no value to RWE’s €15 billion in construction works in progress (approximately 11GW), nor to any potential incremental value from having invested this capital at a return on capital employed (ROCE) exceeding the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
Figure 6. Comparison of RWE’s valuation and current EV expressed as a % of market capitalisation as at 29/08/2025
Source: Antipodes.
The 2020-2025 period posed challenges for renewable asset developers like RWE and Ørsted, however relative shareholder outcomes differed significantly from what was expected in 2021 (see Figure 7). Importantly, Ørsted’s starting position as a clear industry leader in offshore wind development with excellent carbon intensity scores and impressive ESG profile did not help its investors compound their wealth. The experience for RWE investors has been significantly less dramatic yet has still failed to produce adequate returns since Jan 2022. This in our view is an outcome of the market failing to appreciate the substantial intrinsic value creation more than anything else.
Figure 7. Total return index (EUR) since 1 January 2022.
Source: FactSet.
Summary
RWE remains undervalued and misunderstood by investors, and this influences the company’s strategy. The recent decision to cut the Growing Green capex plan by 25% and announce a €1.5bn buyback program provides a clear example of this. In light of the current elevated interest rate environment, policy uncertainty and undervaluation of its shares the company’s board optimised capital allocation policy to maximise shareholder value creation. In our opinion if RWE’s shares traded closer to their intrinsic value, alongside a more constructive policy environment, more capital would be made available for further progress towards Net Zero 2050.
In contrast, in August 2025 Ørsted announced a capital raise equal to roughly half its undisturbed market capitalisation in an effort to improve the company’s balance sheet and ensure it had sufficient capital to complete the construction of its projects under development. After a nearly 80% decline in the share price since January 2022, the market is still willing to provide Ørsted some benefit of doubt and at DKK200/share14 the stock trades at ~8x EV/EBITDA 2028. This assumes no escalation of the construction budget and all projects contribute to EBITDA in line with expectation.
As long-term shareholders in RWE, we remain optimistic that a similar or improved degree of investor confidence will be shown towards RWE in the future.
Stewardship
The Climate Delta methodology is underpinned by a strong ESG framework in line with Antipodes Group policies. Key amongst these is our approach to active corporate engagement with investee and potential investee companies, which is a cornerstone of our stewardship process.
This engagement includes a detailed focus on a “Just Transition”, with Antipodes assessing the impacts on affected workers, communities and regions as portfolio companies undergo large scale transition from traditional fossil fuel projects to renewable assets. We acknowledge the significance of obtaining a social license, as well as securing support from local communities, to effectively achieve decarbonisation objectives.
Case study – RWE AG Engagement: A just transition
In June 2025 Antipodes met with RWE to discuss the company’s decarbonisation plans and approach to a Just Transition. The company has established a Net Zero 2040 target, and we reviewed the necessary requirements to achieve this objective. These include the phased exit from coal in line with mandated German legislation, particularly the cessation of lignite operations in Germany by 2030, where assets are being systematically decommissioned.
The company has detailed four categories of employees affected by this transition. These include:
- Those that will stay with the company and re-cultivate open cast mine land;
- Those who are close to pension age or who will participate in the early retirement scheme agreed to by the German government;
- Younger workers will be re-hired in other departments; and
- Those who cannot be rehired internally will be provided with employment support such as access to external placement services and interview training.
The company continues to offer apprenticeships in phase out technologies. The workforce is heavily unionised and there have been many discussions on plans for impacted workers. Additionally, an employee survey is run regularly, and the company calculates an engagement index. In this way the RWE can keep up to date with employee morale which is an important consideration for the industry.
A Just Transition is crucial for the company given its planned coal exit in 2030, and to date this appears to be well managed between RWE and the German government.
Case study – Fortum Oyj Engagement: A just transition
Finnish energy company Fortum has a Net Zero by 2040 target. In September 2025 Antipodes met with CEO Markus Rauramo to discuss this target and the company’s approach to a Just Transition. Within this meeting Fortum confirmed the 2030 target of a 49% reduction (Scopes 1, 2 and 3) is well on track.
Given the company’s ambitious plans, it is encouraging that many affected workers already have transferable skills relevant to renewable energy operations, allowing them to find new roles without extensive retraining. These skills are also applicable in industries such as processing and steel. In some cases, the company has provided individual transition plans to support workers.
Biodiversity is becoming an increasingly important focus for the company, with consideration for biodiversity integrated into Fortum’s growth strategies. Fortum has also made a commitment to no net loss of biodiversity from existing or new operations from 2030 onwards (Scope 1 and 2).
Overall, we remain comfortable with the company’s approach to a Just Transition and its proactive approach to emerging sustainability risks such as biodiversity loss.
